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Bad Ad(Vice): On the Supreme
Court’s Approach to Press Freedom,
Source Protection and State Interests
in R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc.
Justin Safayeni and Mannu Chowdhury*

I. INTRODUCTION
Does a journalist have to turn over records of online chats with a nonconfidential source to the state, so that those records can be used to
prosecute the source? That is the question at the heart of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc.1 In Vice, the
source allegedly left Canada to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS); the journalist contacted him through an encrypted instant
messaging application and published articles based on their
conversations. After charging the source with terrorism-related offences,
the RCMP obtained an ex parte production order requiring Vice Media
Canada (Vice) and its journalist to hand over the chat records. All nine
judges — the five-judge majority, led by Moldaver J., and the four-judge
concurrence, led by Abella J. — concluded that this production order
should be upheld.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed broader questions
about how media and state interests are to be balanced when determining
whether to authorize search warrants or production orders targeting
material in the hands of journalists or the media (media orders). The
majority reaffirmed the basic elements of the governing framework
*
Justin Safayeni is a partner at Stockwoods LLP. He represented a coalition of interveners
before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018
SCC 53 (S.C.C.). This article represents his own views and not those of any of these clients. Mannu
Chowdhury is a recent call to the Ontario bar. The Authors are grateful to Benjamin Berger, Sonia
Lawrence, and Emily Kidd White for the invitation to present at the 2019 Osgoode Constitutional
Cases Conference, which helped to shape this article.
1
[2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53 (S.C.C.).
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established in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, 2 with some
minor revisions. The majority also changed the process for media parties
to challenge ex parte media orders, both by suggesting that the media
should ordinarily receive notice, and by setting out the conditions under
which de novo review is available when challenging an order.
The concurring judges endorsed significant conceptual changes in
assessing media orders. Rather than adhere to the traditional Lessard
balancing framework, rooted primarily in the media’s privacy interests
protected under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights of
Freedoms,3 Abella J. proposed a new “harmonized” approach that balances
both the privacy interests and the unique constitutionalized protections
afforded to “freedom of the press and other media” under section 2(b) of
the Charter. In the end, however, the concurring judges’ approach offers
few practical differences from that of the majority.
We argue that the majority decision in Vice fails to adequately protect
the media’s constitutionally protected right of news-gathering. Although
the majority improves the press’s ability to challenge media orders, its
application of those principles raises considerable doubt about the extent
of their impact. When it comes to the Lessard approach, the majority
neglects to recognize the presumptive “chilling effects” of media orders
targeting journalist-source communications, giving them short shrift in
the balancing analysis. On the other end of the balancing scale, by
adopting a highly formalistic approach when characterizing the state’s
“investigative” interest, the majority tilts the analysis firmly in favour of
law enforcement’s interests.
We propose a revised balancing framework for media orders. Justice
Abella’s concurring opinion provides a useful starting point for
rethinking the traditional approach to media orders, but falls short in
establishing a framework that, at a practical level, affords the necessary
degree of protection to the press. The logic of her opinion leads to the
conclusion that most, if not all, media orders will result in a section 2(b)
breach. Thus, we propose that justifying such orders requires more than
just “balancing” interests; it requires a section 1 justification for rights
infringement under the Oakes test. 4 This closely mirrors the approach
taken by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in her dissenting opinion in
Lessard some 30 years ago.
2

[1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lessard”].
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
3
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Our analysis is divided into three sections. First, we summarize the
background of Vice, the Supreme Court’s judgment, and its continued
relevance in light of the Journalistic Sources Protection Act.5 Next, we
examine weaknesses of the majority decision. Finally, we propose a
revised framework built upon the constitutional arguments adopted in the
concurring opinion.

II. THE VICE DECISION
1. Background
In 2014, Ben Makuch, a journalist for Vice, began corresponding with a
Canadian citizen, Farah Mohamed Shirdon, who had allegedly joined ISIS.6
Makuch and Shirdon exchanged instant messages through an application
called “Kik” messenger.7 Based on that correspondence, Makuch wrote and
Vice published three stories related to Shirdon.8
In February 2015, the RCMP obtained an ex parte production order
from the Ontario Court of Justice pursuant to section 487.014 9 of the
Criminal Code.10 The authorizing judge directed Vice and Makuch to provide
the RCMP with all documents relating to their communications with
Shirdon.11
Vice determined that the only documents falling within the ambit of the
order were screen captures of the Kik messages exchanged between
Makuch and Shirdon.12 Instead of providing these documents, Vice sought
to quash the order, arguing that the Lessard analysis did not require
disclosing Makuch’s communications with a source for use against that
source.13
The reviewing judge rejected Vice’s argument, relying on the fact that
Shirdon had neither sought, nor been granted, any promise of
confidentiality from Makuch, and that most (if not all) of the content of
5

S.C. 2017, c. 22 [hereinafter “JSPA”].
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 7 (S.C.C.).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”].
10
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 117 (S.C.C.).
11
Id.
12
Id., at para. 118.
13
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2016] O.J. No. 1597, 2016 ONSC 1961, at paras. 4 and
14 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Vice ONSC”].
6
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the Kik messenger chats had been published in Makuch’s articles.14 Applying
the deferential standard of review that the Supreme Court outlined in R. v.
Garofoli, 15 the reviewing judge held that the authorizing judge “could
have” issued the production order in these circumstances.16
The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the reviewing judge’s
decision concerning the production order,17 concluding that the Garofoli
standard applied to media orders 18 and that the reviewing judge had
adequately considered the “chilling effect” of the impugned order on the
media.19
2. Supreme Court Majority Decision
Before the Supreme Court, Vice sought to fundamentally reform the
legal framework governing media orders. Established in 1991 in Lessard,
the common law framework sets out nine factors to consider when
deciding whether, and on what terms, a production order or search
warrant should be issued against a media entity.
The heart of the Lessard framework is the “balancing” factor. It
requires authorizing judges to
‘ensure that a balance is struck between the competing interests of the
state in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the right to
privacy of the media in the course of their news gathering and news
dissemination’, ... bearing in mind that ‘the media play a vital role in
the functioning of a democratic society’ and that the media will
generally be an innocent third party.20

Vice argued that the balancing analysis from Lessard required
recalibration. Courts must demonstrate greater sensitivity to the “chilling
effect”21 of media orders on the press’s ability to gather and disseminate
news, including by presuming those effects occur whenever media orders
14

Id., at paras. 43-44.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at 1452(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Garofoli”].
The Supreme Court held that a reviewing judge examining an ex parte order should only assess
whether there was “reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the
authorization could have issued”: Vice ONSC, id., at para. 12.
16
Vice ONSC, id., at para. 47 (emphasis omitted).
17
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2017] O.J. No. 1431, 2017 ONCA 231, at para. 6
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Vice ONCA”].
18
Id., at paras. 21-27.
19
Id., at paras. 36-38.
20
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 16.
21
Id., at paras. 25-32.
15
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are made. Vice also argued for a more rigorous assessment of law
enforcement’s interests.22 In this case, since Shirdon’s whereabouts were
unknown and a trial was unlikely to occur, Vice submitted that the State’s
interest in obtaining the Kik records for prosecuting Shirdon was
negligible.23
The Court unanimously upheld the production order. When it came to
the exact legal framework to be applied, however, the Court was split
5-4. The majority offered modest tweaks to the prevailing Lessard
framework. By contrast, the concurring judges, led by Abella J.,
articulated a significant conceptual shift in how these cases are to be
viewed, concluding that they directly engage the protection for “freedom
of the press and other media” enumerated in section 2(b) of the Charter.
In upholding the Lessard approach, the majority reorganized the
framework’s nine factors into a four-step process that focused on
(i) notice to the media parties; (ii) whether the statutory preconditions for
an order were satisfied; (iii) balancing; and (iv) the imposition of
conditions on the order to minimize interference with the media’s news
gathering and dissemination functions.24
At the balancing stage, the majority refused to establish a legal
presumption that chilling effects flow from media orders.25 The chilling
effects considered by the majority included confidential sources refusing
to come forward; journalists avoiding recording and preserving their
notes; the media concealing the fact that they have information of
interest to the police; and the public’s perception that the media is not
independent and impartial. 26 Although attuned to the dangers of such
chilling effects and the difficulties associated with proving them,27 the
majority held that chilling effects are best analyzed on a case-by-case
basis as there might be circumstances where there is little to no chilling
effect.28
On the other side of the balancing ledger, the majority held that “the
prospect of a trial actually taking place is not a relevant factor” in
considering whether to grant the order sought.29 Production orders are
issued at the “investigation and evidence-gathering” stage, where the
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id., at paras. 46-58.
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at paras. 27-29.
Id., at para. 26.
Id., at para. 27.
Id., at paras. 30-31.
Id., at para. 51.
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goal is “investigating and gathering evidence of potential criminality, not
at proving allegations and securing a conviction in court.”30 The prospect
of a trial taking place may be “difficult — if not impossible — to gauge
at this early stage”.31
The majority addressed the Garofoli issue together with the related
question of whether the media ought to be given notice at first instance
before the authorizing judge. Recognizing that the combination of
proceeding ex parte and then leaving the media to overcome a highly
deferential Garofoli standard of review “in some cases, works
unfairness”, 32 the majority held that the media should not be denied
notice of proceedings before the authorizing judge “without good
reason.” 33 “[B]are assertions” or “broad and unsupported claim[s]” by
law enforcement of “urgency” or other concerns will not suffice.34
Where the media does not receive notice, the majority held that there
will be a de novo review before the reviewing judge “if the media points
to information not before the authorizing judge that, in the reviewing
judge’s opinion, could reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s
decision to issue the order”.35 The sort of information that would trigger
a de novo review is context-specific, but the majority offered examples
of new information that would rise to this level, including “specific
evidence … concerning chilling effects.”36
Applying the law to the facts at hand, Moldaver J. concluded that the
production order ought to be upheld, chiefly because the alleged offence
being investigated was serious in character, 37 the Kik screen captures
were probative evidence that could not be secured from other sources,38
the bulk of the information pertaining to Shirdon had been published,39
and Shirdon was not a confidential source.40 While the impugned media
order sought “could arguably raise some concerns over potential chilling
effects”, those concerns were outweighed in the balancing analysis by the
State’s interest in investigating and prosecuting Shirdon for the alleged
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id., at para. 47.
Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 72.
Id., at paras. 67 and 154.
Id., at para. 67.
Id., at para. 73.
Id., at para. 74.
Id., at para. 95.
Id., at paras. 96-97.
Id., at para. 98.
Id., at para. 92.
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offences.41 In addition, the majority found that the absence of notice to
Vice was justified, and that it was appropriate for the reviewing judge to
apply the Garofoli standard of review.42
3. Supreme Court Concurring Decision
Writing for herself and three other judges of the Court, Abella J.
reached the same result as the majority. But her reasoning reflects a
significant conceptual shift in how to approach the constitutional
concerns engaged by media orders. Rather than viewing these cases
predominantly through the lens of section 8 privacy interests protected
under the Charter — as was done in cases like Canadian Broadcasting
Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)43 and R. v. National Post44 —
the concurring judges concluded that courts must also weigh the discrete
constitutionalized protection afforded to “freedom of the press and other
media” under section 2(b) of the Charter.
The concurring judges described the Court as long having “flirted”
with acknowledging an independent right of press freedom under section
2(b).45 For these judges, the time had come to recognize what is “clear”
in the words of that provision: the press has a distinct constitutionalized
freedom under section 2(b).46
The concurring judges proposed a new “harmonized” framework
where sections 8 and 2(b) would both be relied upon to assess the
reasonableness of issuing a media order.47 This harmonized framework
requires a “proportionality inquiry showing essentially that the salutary
effects of the production order outweigh the deleterious effects” 48 by
considering factors such as “the media’s reasonable expectation of
privacy; whether there is a need to target the press ...; whether the
evidence is available from any other source, and if so, whether
41

Id., at paras. 92 and 99.
Id., at paras. 85-86.
43
[1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459, at para. 69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “New
Brunswick”]. The Court, said (at para. 32): “[t]he constitutional protection of freedom of expression
afforded by s. 2(b) of the Charter does not, however, import any new or additional requirements for
the issuance of search warrants. What it does is provide a backdrop against which the reasonableness
of the search may be evaluated.”
44
[2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Post”].
45
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at paras. 109, 121125, and 127-128 (S.C.C.).
46
Id., at paras. 109 and 124-128.
47
Id., at paras. 141-142.
48
Id., at para. 142.
42
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reasonable steps were taken to obtain it ...; and whether the proposed
order is ... tailored”.49
Unlike the majority, the concurring judges accepted that “an obvious
collateral impact on the press of being required to comply with a
production order is a chilling effect not only on the particular press being
targeted, but on the press generally”, 50 adding that this presumptive
chilling effect could be amplified or diminished depending on the
circumstances.51
Regarding the issues of notice to the media and Garofoli review,
Abella J. concluded that notice should be provided to the media except in
“rare cases where the Crown can show that there are exigent
circumstances or that there is a real risk of destruction of the evidence”.52
The “possibility that the press may not ‘cooperate with police’” is
insufficient to meet this threshold.53 Where notice has not been provided,
the reviewing judge should proceed with a de novo balancing analysis in
all cases.54
In the result, however, the concurring judges reach the same decision
as the majority, and for largely the same reasons.55
4. The Continued Relevance of Vice
After the authorizing judge granted the impugned order but before the
Supreme Court heard Vice, the JSPA took effect, establishing a new
statutory framework for media orders granted under the Code. 56 The
JSPA, and not Lessard, now governs media orders sought under the
Code.57
Nevertheless, Vice remains relevant and important for three key
reasons.
First, Vice will continue to inform whether, and under what
conditions, a state entity can seek media orders, pursuant to statutes other
than the Code. This would include, for example, provincial regulators
and agencies with a statutory power to compel the production of
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id., at para. 144.
Id., at para. 147.
Id., at para. 167.
Id., at para. 154.
Id.
Id., at para. 160.
Id., at paras. 162-170.
Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c. 22.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 488.01 and 488.02.
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documents in the course of investigations, or to obtain search warrants
outside the Code’s processes.58
Second, although the Court in Vice emphasized that it was not
interpreting or applying the JSPA, 59 it seems inevitable that the key
components of Vice will find their way into the JSPA analysis. That is
because the JSPA is an attempt to codify the existing common law
protections set out in cases like Lessard.60 Given this legislative purpose,
one can reasonably expect that courts will take guidance from Vice when
interpreting the JSPA.
Finally, recognizing and applying a distinct constitutional protection
for “freedom of the press” in section 2(b) may be where a majority of the
Court ultimately lands in the years ahead. The majority was careful not to
close the door on this approach. Instead, it held that the concurring
judges’ approach was not “necessary” to dispose of the appeal, and was
an issue that neither the parties, nor the courts below, had fully argued or
addressed.61

III. WHAT WENT WRONG: THREE MAJOR
SHORTCOMINGS OF VICE
Three aspects of the majority’s decision in Vice undermine the
protection of the media’s interests in the context of media orders. First,
while the Court bolsters notice requirements and allows for de novo
review in certain media order cases, the way the Court applies these
concepts in Vice raises doubts about their practical impact. Second, the
Court fails to recognize a presumption of chilling effects when media
orders of any kind are sought. Third, the Court’s formalistic approach to
weighing the state’s interests tilts the analysis in favour of the state,
58
See Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 13; Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, S.O 1998,
c. 15, Schedule B, ss. 108 and 112.0.2; Regulated Health Professions Code, being Schedule 2 to the
Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, ss. 75-77. This is not purely hypothetical:
see, e.g., Mulgrew v. Law Society of British Columbia, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1468, 2016 BCSC 1279
(B.C.S.C.); Moysa v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board), [1989] S.C.J. No. 54, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1572,
60 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
59
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at paras. 6 and 161
(S.C.C.).
60
“Bill S-231, Journalistic Sources Protection Act, An Act to amend the Canada Evidence
Act and the Criminal Code (protection of journalistic sources), 2nd reading, House of Commons
Debates, 42-1, No. 175 (May 11, 2017), at 1734 (Hon. Joël Lightbound).
61
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at paras. 104-105
(S.C.C.).
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including by refusing to consider the likelihood of a trial taking place in
determining whether media orders should be issued.
1. Notice and Review Process for Media Orders: Genuine
Improvement or Paper Tiger?
The majority decision in Vice improves the fairness of the process for
challenging media by encouraging authorizing judges to provide the
media with notice, and by providing for de novo review in certain cases.
However, the application of these principles in Vice raises significant
concerns about the extent to which they will improve the media’s ability
to effectively respond in these types of cases.
The majority found that the absence of notice in Vice was justified
because the material before the authorizing judge “identifies a risk that
once alerted to the police’s interest in the material, the appellants could
move the materials beyond the reach of Canadian courts”62 and “states
that there was no basis on which to be assured that the appellants [Vice
and Makuch] would cooperate with the police”.63 These speculative concerns
epitomize the “bare assertions” that the majority explained would be
insufficient to justify ex parte proceedings. Nevertheless, Moldaver J.
goes no further than to acknowledge the explanation “could have been
stronger and better supported,” while upholding the authorizing judge’s
decision not to require notice.64
Equally concerning is the majority’s approach to whether there was
information that “could reasonably have affected” the authorizing judge’s
decision, so as to attract de novo review. Before the reviewing judge,
Vice filed affidavit evidence from Makuch addressing how turning over
material to the RCMP would harm Makuch’s ability to do his job,
including his view that sources like Shirdon would not speak to him if
they knew the resulting records would be provided to police.65 This sworn
testimony was new to the reviewing judge and goes directly to how the
impugned order impacts the media’s ability to gather and report news,
which is a key consideration under the Lessard balancing analysis.
Remarkably, however, the majority concluded that the statements could
not reasonably have affected the authorizing judge’s decision because
62
63
64
65

Id., at para. 85.
Id.
Id.
Id., at para. 86.
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they were “too general” in nature.66 As such, the majority concluded that
the reviewing court was correct to apply the traditional Garofoli standard
in this case.
The contrast between the sparse evidence the majority requires to
justify dispensing with notice, and what the heightened standard required
to warrant de novo review, is striking in this case. Despite articulating an
improved process for challenging media orders, the application of that
process in Vice reflects a troubling willingness to entertain vague
concerns by law enforcement to justify proceeding ex parte, while
holding the media to an almost impossible standard of specificity for the
type of “chilling effect” evidence that will warrant departing from the
Garofoli standard of review.
2. Chilling Effects of Media Orders: One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back
At the heart of the Vice appeal was the issue of whether the law
should recognize a presumption that media orders create chilling effects,
impairing the media’s ability to gather and report the news.
The majority takes commendable steps in articulating nuanced views
on the chilling effects of media orders, including acknowledging that
measuring such effects with precision can be a “difficult” if not an
“impossible” task, and confirming that the harmful consequences of such
effects can be “considerable”.67 What the majority fails to do, however, is
recognize that these considerations demand presuming a harmful chill on
the media’s ability to gather and report news from the issuance of media
orders — or at least certain types of media orders. Rarely, if ever, will the
media be able to “prove” that chilling effects flow from a particular
media order. But just as the law takes judicial notice of “libel chill” in
defamation law,68 so too should it presume a degree of chill from media
orders like the one sought in Vice. By refusing to recognize such a
presumption, the majority left the media without the benefit of any
presumed harm, in a situation where the nature of that harm may make it
impossible to prove with any exactitude, and the harm itself is both
insidious and significant.
66

Id.
Id., at paras. 27-28 and 31.
68
Grant v. Torstar Corp, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, at para. 2 (S.C.C.). See M.D.
Lepofsky, “Making Sense of the Libel Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws ‘Chill’ the Exercise of Freedom
of Expression?” (1994) 4 N.J.C.L. 169.
67
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If the presumption sought by Vice — that any media order would
result in chilling effects — was too broad for the majority,69 then the
majority still ought to have recognized a presumption of chilling effects
in some situations where production orders or search warrants target the
media. At minimum, a presumption of chilling effects should be
recognized where media orders target material that forms part of a
journalist’s private work product (recordings, notes, etc.) and/or where it
would reveal the identity of a journalist’s confidential sources.
The jurisprudential seeds for recognizing a presumption of chilling
effects in both of these circumstances were planted years earlier. In La
Forest J.’s concurring opinion in Lessard, he accepted that chilling
effects would flow from orders targeting a “reporter’s work product”
such as “personal notes, recordings of interviews and source ‘contact
lists’.”70 (The majority does not address this issue.) Thus, while Moldaver J.
is correct that Lessard, and its companion case New Brunswick, provide
“ample support” for the proposition that chilling effects “should not be
presumed” in all cases, 71 those cases do not reject the proposition that
chilling effects ought to be presumed in some cases. To the extent that
proposition is addressed at all, it is expressly endorsed by La Forest J. for
media orders targeting a journalist’s work product.
The jurisprudential foundation for a presumption of chilling effects is
even stronger where the material sought would identify confidential
sources. In National Post, a majority of the Supreme Court found that the
media made a
convincing case that unless the media can offer anonymity in situations
where sources would otherwise dry-up, freedom of expression in
debate on matters of public interest would be badly compromised.
Important stories will be left untold... .72

Not only did the majority in Vice fail to follow in the footsteps of
National Post, it took steps in the opposite direction by interpreting
National Post as a case where the Court saw no reason to recognize
presumed chilling effects.73 Technically, this is correct: the Court’s comments
in National Post are not styled or framed as a legal presumption, as the
69

R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, at para. 28 (S.C.C.).
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421, at
431-32 (S.C.C.).
71
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 29 (S.C.C.).
72
R. v. National Post, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).
73
R. v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] S.C.J. No. 53, 2018 SCC 53, at para. 29 (S.C.C.).
70
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focus of that case was elsewhere. But National Post is premised on the
need to offer confidential sources an extra degree of protection because
of the recognized harm revealing their identity can detrimentally affect
the media’s ability to report the news.
One consequence of the majority’s failure to adopt a presumption of
chilling effects is uncertainty over what type of evidence will be required
to establish chilling effects in future cases. Will it be sufficient to show
evidence of circumstances related to the material sought, such as the
identity of sources, material that was not meant for publication, or a
journalist’s work product? Or does the majority expect media parties to
marshal an evidentiary record attempting to directly link compelled
disclosure of such material to chilling effects? If the former is required,
then the majority ought to have clarified that the law will presume
chilling effects in some, but not all, circumstances — and outlined what
circumstances will attract the presumption. If the latter is what the
majority intended, then that imposes what the majority tacitly
acknowledges is an unrealistic burden.
3. An Unduly Formalistic View of the State’s Investigative Interests
While the majority and concurring judges differ on the issues of
notice, Garofoli review, and chilling effects, they agree that the prospects
for trial should not be taken into account when weighing the state’s
interests.
This is one of the most troubling aspects of the Court’s reasoning.
It ignores the reality of why the RCMP is seeking to compel production
of the Kik screen captures. These records have minimal value in terms of
investigating who committed the alleged offence or the details of that
alleged offence. Indeed, the RCMP identified and charged Shirdon before
seeking a production order, and the substantive contents of the Kik
screen shots had already been published. This is the key distinguishing
feature between the nature of the law enforcement’s interests in a case
like Vice as compared to cases like Lessard or New Brunswick (where
police sought videotapes to identify those said to have engaged in
criminal activity74) or National Post (where police wanted the media to

74
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produce documents to determine if they could identify the sender through
forensic testing75).
In Vice, the true value of the Kik screen shots was, as the reviewing
judge put it, that they “provided the best and most reliable evidence of
what Shirdon said.” 76 While that may be true, this kind of evidencegathering-for-trial purpose is very different from the true investigative
purpose being served by the orders at issue in Lessard, New Brunswick
and National Post. Once it is recognized that the purpose of the order is
to gather and preserve evidence for trial rather than investigate the
occurrence or perpetrators of a crime, then the prospect of that trial
actually occurring becomes a significant consideration in the Lessard
balancing analysis.
This is not to say that courts should attempt to limit the odds of a trial
in every case where police seek a media order. However, where the
prospect of a trial is highly unlikely — for example, because the suspect
is believed to be dead77 — then courts ought to find that an early attempt
to force the media to turn over records is unjustified. In those
circumstances, an order requiring the media to preserve the records, and
providing law enforcement with an opportunity to apply for a media
order closer to trial, would strike a more appropriate balance between
these competing interests. Having declared the prospect of a trial
occurring “not relevant” to the analysis, the Court has all but eliminated
this pragmatic solution from the toolkit of authorizing and reviewing
courts.

IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
MEDIA ORDERS
The majority’s revised Lessard approach to assessing media orders
affords inadequate protections to the press, both procedurally and
substantively.
Our point of departure for a new proposed framework is Abella J.’s
recognition that media orders engage the distinct and independent
75
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constitutional protection afforded to “freedom of the press” under
section 2(b) of the Charter. As others have noted, this recognition is long
overdue.78
Yet when it comes to translating this bold conceptual shift into a
practical framework that offers robust protection for freedom of the
press, the concurring opinion falls short. Justice Abella’s proposed
“proportionality inquiry” — together with the list of factors she
articulates as relevant considerations in that inquiry — are virtually
indistinguishable from the existing Lessard balancing factor.79 Considered
in this light, it is less surprising that the concurring judges reach the same
result as the majority.
Taking the Charter’s protection for press freedom seriously requires
more than a stand-alone balancing or “proportionality” inquiry when
determining whether media orders should be issued. Instead, in most
cases, such orders will trigger a section 2(b) violation, and thus they
should only be granted if the applicant can meet the Oakes test under
section 1 of the Charter — an approach similar to the one taken nearly
30 years ago by McLachlin J. in her dissenting opinion in Lessard.
1. Most Media Orders Violate Section 2(b)
Before examining the Oakes test, the threshold question to be asked is
whether media orders constitute a section 2(b) violation. While Abella J.
does not expressly reach this conclusion, the logical consequence of her
analysis and the approach taken in existing freedom of expression
jurisprudence indicate that media orders will normally violate section 2(b).
In determining whether media orders violate section 2(b)’s press
freedom protection, guidance can be taken from freedom of expression
cases where courts ask whether the activity in question “falls within the
sphere of conduct protected by freedom of expression” and, if so,
whether the impugned state conduct restricts expression in its purpose or
effect.80
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The ambit of protected press freedom activity under section 2(b) will
not be as wide as under the freedom of expression clause (which protects
virtually all expressive activity, short of violence or threats of violence81).
Still, it ought to be generously construed given its underlying purpose,
which Abella J. describes as the dissemination of news to the public or “the
public’s right to know”.82 The concurring justices stress that section 2(b)’s
press protection would extend to a broad swath of material including La
Forest J.’s conception of journalistic “work product”, 83 communications
with confidential sources, material that includes “off the record” or “not
for attribution” commentary, and a journalist’s documentation of their
investigative work.84 The concurring judges conclude that “the more the
activity accords with standards of professional journalistic ethics,” the
more amenable it will be for inclusion under section 2(b)’s sphere of press
protection.85 This suggests that records of discussions between journalists
and their non-confidential sources would also fall under the ambit of press
protection, given that journalism standards stress a preference for having
“on the record” discussion with named sources, as opposed to relying on
confidential ones.86
Where the impugned conduct restricts section 2(b) rights, then an
infringement is made out provided the activity promotes one of the values
underlying section 2(b).87 Most news-gathering activities will promote the
purpose of the press protection guarantee. An infringement is made out
where there is interference with, or restriction of, the section 2(b) right.88
This would include the kind of chilling effects that Abella J.
recognizes as presumptively present where the media are innocent
third parties and compelled to adhere to media orders. By creating
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such chilling effects, typical media orders will restrict the press’s ability
to gather and report the news and result in a section 2(b) violation.
There is some tension between this conclusion and the holding in
National Post that protecting the identity of confidential sources does
not fall within the ambit of section 2(b).89 However, the constitutional
argument in National Post was framed as a “freedom of expression”
issue, and not under section 2(b)’s “freedom of the press” clause. This
led the majority to warn that extending a constitutional immunity to
“‘everyone’ … who chooses to exercise his or her freedom of expression
on matters of public interest whether by blogging, tweeting, standing on
a street corner and shouting the ‘news’ at passing pedestrians …” and
“whichever sources they deem worthy of a promise of confidentiality”
would “blow a giant hole in law enforcement”.90 In our section 2(b) press
freedom analysis, these concerns are mitigated: although courts will have
to grapple with the precise contours of press protection, it is much more
tightly confined than the general right to free expression found in
section 2(b).
In any event, the Court’s willingness to entertain section 2(b)
protections for confidential sources and other journalistic material has
evolved since National Post. For the concurring justices in Vice, a more
likely source of inspiration was McLachlin J.’s dissent in Lessard, which
articulates the myriad of ways that media orders interfere with the ability
of the media to perform their news-gathering function, and contemplates
narrow circumstances where state restrictions on the press would not
violate section 2(b) (e.g., documents relating to an alleged offence by the
press itself).91
2. Applying the Oakes Test to Media Orders
Once a section 2(b) press protection violation has been established,
the focus shifts to the Oakes test under section 1.92 Unlike the balancing
or free-standing proportionality inquiry adopted by the majority and the
concurring judges in Vice — and the original balancing framework
established in Lessard — under Oakes it is the state that bears the onus
89
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of establishing, on proper evidence, that the interference with the section
2(b) right is justified.
At the first stage of Oakes, the state must demonstrate the impugned
measure serves a “pressing and substantial objective”.93 This is a relatively
low bar. As McLachlin J. noted in Lessard, “... [i]t goes without saying
that the pressing objective required by Oakes — the effective prosecution
and prevention of crime — will normally be established where the police
seek evidence relevant to the commission of an offence.”94 Although it
will rarely be dispositive, requiring the state to demonstrate a pressing
and substantial objective is a necessary safeguard for press protection,
particularly with media orders sought outside the Code context.
The second part of Oakes comprises of three questions:95
(i) Is there a rational connection between the right restriction and the
government objective at stake?
(ii) Does the limit infringe the right or freedom no more than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective?
(iii) Do the salutary effects of the restriction outweigh its deleterious
effects, especially “in terms of the greater public good”?96

As McLachlin J. observed in Lessard, the state will fail to meet the
rational connection requirement for a media order if there are reasonable
alternative sources for the information being sought, because in that case
“the necessary link between the infringement and the state goal justifying
it is absent.”97 This approach affords a clearer and more robust level of
press protection than the Lessard balancing analysis or Abella J.’s
proportionality inquiry. Under both of those approaches, the existence of
alternative sources of information is a factor to be taken into account, but
not necessarily an impediment to obtaining the order sought.98
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The state will also fail to meet the rational connection requirement if
it cannot establish a “causal connection … on the basis of reason or
logic” between the impugned measure and the stated objective.99 Thus,
where a media order is being sought for the purpose of assisting in a
prosecution, the rational connection inquiry calls for some consideration
of whether the trial of the alleged offender will take place. If the
individual is not going to stand trial, then the media order cannot be
rationally connected to the purpose of assisting to prosecute that
individual.
The minimal impairment stage focuses on whether “the measure at
issue impairs the right as little as reasonably possible in furthering the
legislative objective”.100 Under this prong, courts will focus on the scope
of the media order sought (to ensure it does not go further than what is
required) and the terms upon which it may be granted (to ensure it does
not disrupt or interfere with the media any more than is required).101
Even if a trial is likely to occur, where the material sought is for use
as evidence at trial rather than to investigate the alleged offences, a
premature request for records from the media could fail at this stage of
the analysis. The objective of gathering the best evidence for trial could
be served by preserving the records and bringing the application at a later
date, recognizing that such an application may be unnecessary if the trial
does not occur.
The last phase of the Oakes test is where courts must balance the
salutary and deleterious effects of the order being sought. This requires
examining and calibrating the extent of the chilling effects against the
state’s interests. Given the difficulties of adducing reliable, direct and
specific evidence about chilling effects, the deleterious effects of the
order being sought should be determined by reference to the nature of,
and circumstances surrounding, the material itself. Here, the factors
outlined by the concurring judges in Vice are relevant, including: whether
the material would identify confidential sources; whether it includes
information not meant for publication; and whether it includes a
journalist’s work product. The overarching question is the extent to
which the material can be expected to interfere with the media’s ability to
perform its protected function of gathering news for the public.
99
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Beyond maintaining the justification onus on the state and imposing a
more rigorous framework grounded in section 2(b)’s protection for
freedom of the press, the Oakes approach also dispenses with the frailties
in the Vice majority’s approach to notice and the standard of review.
There can be no real question that the media is entitled to de novo review
(if not notice at first instance) where its constitutional rights are engaged
by a media order.
Applying this new framework in Vice ought to have led to a different
result.
Given the true purpose for which the Kik records were sought and the
remote prospects of Shirdon standing trial at all, the media order ought to
have failed at the rational connection or minimal impairment stages.
In the final balancing analysis, a more nuanced examination on the
extent of the presumed chilling effects on the particular facts in Vice —
driven by the nature of and circumstances surrounding the Kik screen
shots — also ought to have tilted in favour of denying the order sought.
The Kik records are 21st century equivalent of a journalist’s “interview
recordings”, which form a key part of a journalist’s work product.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, to paraphrase U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart’s observation on the impact of disclosing the
identity of confidential sources, it “requires no blind leap of faith to
understand”102 that if the media is forced to turn over its communications
with sources for use against those sources — regardless of whether their
identities or communications have been published — then that will make
it harder for sources to come forward in the future. At the very least, it
would motivate sources to offer information on a strictly confidential or
“off the record” basis. Neither result promotes the objective of a free and
transparent press.

V. CONCLUSION
Vice was a missed opportunity to modify the Lessard balancing
framework in ways that afford stronger protection to the media’s
interests. A juridical overhaul was needed, not a tinker. The majority’s
refusal to recognize the presumed chilling effects of media orders in any
circumstance, together with its formalistic approach to evaluating the
“investigative” interests of law enforcement, stacks the balancing deck
against the press in these types of cases. These problems are further
102
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exacerbated by the fact that, in practice, the majority decision risks
setting a relatively low bar for when media orders may be obtained ex
parte, and when Garofoli review will continue to apply.
The silver lining of Vice lies in Abella J.’s concurring opinion. It may
mark the beginning of a longer jurisprudential arc that ushers in a new
way of conceptualizing and protecting press freedom under the Charter
— as a distinct species of section 2(b) rights enjoyed by “the press and
other media”, rather than through the lens of freedom of expression or
section 8 of the Charter.
The consequences of this shift for media orders are profound. They
demand more than the modified Lessard balancing framework endorsed
by the majority, or the virtually identical proportionality inquiry
proposed by the concurring judges. Recognizing that most media orders
will have chilling effects that infringe of section 2(b)’s freedom of press
protection, the requesting party ought to be required to justify such
orders under the Oakes test. In this way, the concurring opinion gives
renewed life to the possibility of courts adopting the section 1-based
approach to justifying media orders adopted by McLachlin J. nearly
30 years ago in her dissenting opinion in Lessard.

